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I. INTRODUCTION
Marriage taxation presents a "trilemma": An income tax cannot
simultaneously maintain progressive marginal tax rates, an equal tax
burden for all married couples with identical incomes ("couples eq-
uity"), and neutrality with respect to the tax burden of married versus
unmarried couples ("marriage neutrality").
In both academic debate and historical experience, progressive mar-
ginal income tax rates have been considered inviolable. Instead, de-
bate and experience see-saw between forgoing couples equity or
marriage neutrality.' Proponents of couples equity, implemented by
the joint filing system in place since 1948, argue that household in-
come sharing justifies taxing married couples as a single unit.2 And if
we are comparing units of taxation with identical incomes, tax equity
prescribes that these units should be taxed identically. Proponents of
marriage neutrality, by contrast, contest the notion that married
couples are a single unit and abhor the marriage penalties and mar-
riage bonuses that follow from a progressive income tax with couples
equity. These scholars advocate individual filing. Everyone, married
or single, should pay tax on their own income, regardless of their mar-
ital status, as they did from the advent of the income tax until 1948.3
With the exception of one paper focusing on the intersection of tax
law with property and family law,4 scholars insist that we abandon
either (or both) couples equity and/or marriage neutrality.
In this Article, I assume that the principles of couples equity and
marriage neutrality both have merit. Alternatively, I assume that the
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I thank Michael Graetz, Louis Kaplow, Al
Klevorick, Alex Raskolnikov, and seminar participants at Columbia Law School, Harvard
Law School, University of Maryland Law School, and NYU Law School for many helpful
comments. All errors are my own.
1 See Edward McCaffery, Taxing Women 23-26 (1997), and Lawrence Zelenak, Doing
Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 Tax L. Rev. 1, 17-19
(2000), for a review of this literature.
2 See, e.g., Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Compre-
hensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1572, 1590 (1977).
3 See, e.g., Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint
Return World, 61 Hastings L.J. 651, 684-85 (2010).
4 Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 145,
240-44 (1998).
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principles proxy for some more fundamental principles that result in
an analogous trilemma. I also assume that the costs of deviations
from either principle are convex; large deviations from either princi-
ple are disproportionately distasteful relative to small deviations.
5
Under these conditions, the best schedule for the taxation of mar-
riage maintains neither perfect couples equity nor perfect marriage
neutrality. Instead, the optimal marriage taxation regime violates
both couples equity and marriage neutrality, but to a smaller degree
than previous and existing marriage taxation systems. Under my as-
sumptions, violating two principles a little is better than violating one
principle a lot.
The marriage taxation framework presented here offers a number
of advantages. It transforms the debate regarding couples equity and
marriage neutrality into one of degree rather than kind. Couples eq-
uity and marriage neutrality are merely two extremes along a spec-
trum. Indeed, the Code already contains several provisions that
implicitly move the Code away from a pure couples equity system to a
system that maintains neither couples equity nor marriage neutrality.
6
Finally, my framework enables me to bring the third leg of the
trilemma-progressive marginal tax rates-back into the discussion.
Progressivity, without being discarded, may be reduced to lessen devi-
ations from couples equity, marriage neutrality, or both.
II. THE TAXATION OF MARRIAGE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Edwin Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy, offered the following widely cited proof of the trilemma posed
by the simultaneous desire to have progressive marginal tax rates,
couples equity, and marriage neutrality.7
Assume there are four people, A, B, C, and D. A and B each make
$10,000, C makes $0, and D makes $20,000. The taxes owed by indi-
vidual A are denoted by T(A), and the individual tax rates are 10% on
the first $10,000 in income and 25% on income in excess of $10,000.)
Progressive marginal tax rates imply that the tax on C and D, as indi-
viduals, is greater than the combined tax on A and B.
T(C) + T(D) > T(A) + T(B) (I)
5 For discussion of this assumption, see Part III.
6 See Zelenak, note 1, at 4-8.
7 Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses Are Work-
ing: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong. 78-79 (1972) (state-
ment of Edwin S. Cohen, Ass't Sec'y for Tax Pol'y); see Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H.
Schenk, Federal Income Taxation, Principles and Policies 451-52 (7th ed. 2013) (citing Co-
hen testimony).
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Suppose that A and B (AB) and C and D (CD) get married. Mar-
riage neutrality requires that each couple pay the same amount of in-
come tax as they paid when single.
T(AB) = T(A) + T(B) (II)
and
T(CD) = T(C) + T(D) (III)
Couples equity requires that the income tax paid by both couples
must be equal.
T(AB) = T(CD) (IV)
There is a contradiction. Replacing the right hand side of (I) with
its value from (II) and replacing the left hand side of (I) with its value
from (III) implies that T(CD) > T(AB).
This contradicts (IV), so the conditions are incompatible. A numer-




Taxpayer Tax if Married Married Joint Married Joint Marriage Violation of
(Income) Single Individual Filing Filing (Couples Filing (Couples Neutrality and Both Couples
(Marriage Equity), 1948- Equity), 1969- Couples Equity Equity and
Neutrality) 1969 Regime 2014 Regime Marriage
Neutrality
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4) (5)
A $1000 $2000 $2000 $2150 Impossible $2500
($10,000) (No change in (Same as CD) (Same as CD) (AB is different (Greater than
tax on from CD in col. individual filing
marriage) (2) due to the but less than
progressivity of CD)
the tax
B $1000 schedule, but
($10,000) AB is the same
as CD in cols.
(3a) and (3b).)
C $0 $3500 $2000 $2150 $3000
($0) (No change in (Same as AB) (Same as AB) (Less than
tax on individual filing





Table Description: For individual filing, columns (1) and (2), akin
to § 1(c) filing, reflect a 10% marginal rate on the first $10,000 of in-
come and a 25% marginal rate on income in excess of $10,000. Col-
umn (2) presents total taxes paid by the couple. For married joint
filing, akin to § 1(a) from 1948 to 1969, column (3a) reflects a 10%
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marginal rate on the first $20,000 of income and a 25% marginal rate
on income in excess of $20,000. For married joint filing, akin to § 1(a)
from 1969 to the present, column (3b) applies a 10% marginal rate on
the first $19,000 of income and a 25% marginal rate on income in
excess of $19,000. Column (4) demonstrates that simultaneous
progressivity, marriage neutrality, and couple equity is impossible.
Column (5) presents a hypothetical marriage taxation schedule consis-
tent with the policy recommendations of this Article that can be
achieved in many different ways.
What to do? From 1948 through the present day, the Code has pri-
oritized progressive marginal tax rates and couples equity, as in col-
umn (3) of Table 1.8 This choice has several implications. It creates
marriage penalties and bonuses. If couples AB and CD are to pay the
same amount in taxes, then one or both couples will pay a different
amount than if they had remained single and filed individually. In
Table 1, column (3a), a tax of $2000 on married couples filing jointly
gives a marriage bonus to CD (who would pay a combined $3500 if
they remained single) and neutrality to AB (who would pay a com-
bined $2000 if they remained single). This was the tax rate under
§ 1(a) from 1948 to 1969. A tax between $2000 and $3500 imposes a
marriage penalty on AB and a bonus on CD. This characterizes to-
day's § 1(a) filing schedule.
Choosing progressive rates and couples equity imposes high margi-
nal tax rates on secondary earners. If C in couple CD takes D's in-
come as given, then C's first dollar of income will be taxed at the same
rate as D's last dollar of income. This would not be the case if C were
single, in which case C (who has no income) would be taxed at the
lowest marginal rate. 9
Critics of joint filing argue that couples equity is not a compelling
principle for structuring taxation of marriage. They claim that mar-
ried couples with identical incomes are not necessarily equal from a
tax perspective. Two-earner married couples, such as AB, may have
higher expenses and lower imputed income than single-earner mar-
8 The Code achieves this by giving married couples the choice of filing jointly under
§ l(a) or as a married individual filing separately under § 1(d). Joint filing under § l(a) has
a progressive rate structure and taxes married couples based on joint income, implement-
ing couples equity. Section 1(d) allows for separate filing by each member of a married
couple, but the rates and brackets of § 1(d) are so unfavorable that nearly all married
couples pay less tax by filing under the § l(a) schedule. Single individuals follow the
schedule of § 1(b) or § l(c). The distinction between § l(b) (for heads of households) and
§ l(c) (for unmarried individuals who are not heads of households as described in § 2(b)) is
relevant only for unmarried couples with children, which is beyond the scope of this discus-
sion. See McCaffery, note 1, at 16.
9 See McCaffery, note 1, at 19-21.
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ried couples like CD, and should be taxed differently.10 In addition,
joint filing imposes high marginal rates of tax on potential second
earners such as C. 11 High rates on secondary earners are likely ineffi-
cient, as secondary earners' labor decisions are much more sensitive to
taxes than primary earners' labor decisions.12 Moreover, high tax
rates on secondary earners reinforce stereotyped gender roles, provid-
ing a financial incentive for one member of a couple-typically, a wo-
man-to stay at home.' 3
The undesirable properties associated with maintaining couples eq-
uity have led many commentators to prefer individual filing for mar-
ried couples as well as singles, which was the structure of the Code
from its inception through 1948.14 Marriage neutrality implemented
through individual filing ameliorates or eliminates many of the failings
associated with adherence to couples equity.
Proponents of couples equity relative to marriage neutrality muster
several counterarguments. The U.S. income tax system measures abil-
ity-to-pay taxes by income. As a result, if married couples are an eco-
nomic unit, then there is a presumptive case that they should pay the
same tax if they have the same income. 15 While it is true that couples
with the same income are not identical, with some having more im-
puted income and others less (among other things), this is equally true
of singles. Some single earners earn their income working long hours
at a difficult job. Others earn the same income working fewer hours
at a more pleasant job. But an income tax taxes both singles the same.
Some of the arguments against couples equity are therefore really crit-
icisms of taxation of income more generally.
Joint filing, which implements couples equity, is appropriate if abil-
ity to pay is properly measured by the collective income of a married
couple rather than individual income. In a widely cited article on joint
filing that supports the continuation of joint filing and couples equity,
Boris Bittker reported the following position on the issue:
10 See id. at 23-28. In a single-earner marriage, the nonworking spouse may have signifi-
cant imputed income from self-provided services such as childcare. See Zelenak, note 1, at
17 n.77.
11 See McCaffery, note 1, at 19.
12 See Johnathan Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evi-
dence and Implications, 84 J. Pub. Econ. 1, 4 (2002).
13 See McCaffery, note 1, at 20-23.
14 See id. at 5. Recent articles making this argument include James M. Puckett, Rethink-
ing Tax Priorities: Marriage Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 1409, 1434-35 (2010); Kahng, note 5, at 681-84.
15 See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1389,
1431-33 (1975); McIntyre, note 2, at 1592-99. For a more recent defense of joint filing with
a different definition of a marriage penalty, see Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre,
Fixing the "Marriage Penalty" Problem, 33 Val. U. L. Rev. 907 (1999).
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[A]s soon as a marriage is contracted, it is the continued in-
come and financial position of the family which is ordinarily
of primary concern, not the income and financial position of
the individual members. Thus, the married couple itself
adopts the economic concept of the family as the income unit
from the outset .... It is probably even more true that the
newly formed family acts as a financial unit in making its
expenditures.16
Bittker concludes that couples equity has been "a dominant theme
of tax theory for at least 50 years. ' 17 The position adopted by Bittker
is likely overstated. Married couples function as economic units for
some purposes but not for others. The distribution of earnings within
a married couple is not irrelevant, as it would be if a married couple is
truly an undifferentiated economic unit.18 But it is also true that the
earnings of a spouse are not irrelevant. An individual with no income
is considerably better off if their spouse earns a high income than if
their spouse earns little. Bittker's position may be exaggerated, but it
is not without a kernel of merit.
Bittker and other proponents of joint filing also observe that
mandatory individual filing for married couples introduces income-
shifting incentives. 19 Higher-earning spouses will attempt to shift in-
come to the lower-earning spouse to lower the couples' aggregate tax
burden.20 Indeed, the impossibility of joint filing before 1948 led to
complicated alterations to state property law in an effort to facilitate
income shifting.2 1 Joint filing eliminates the incentive to engage in
specious transactions or otherwise undesirable legal changes in an at-
tempt to minimize the total tax liability of a married couple. Joint
16 Bittker, note 15, at 1393 (quoting Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation
122-24 (1966) (Carter Commission)).
17 Id. at 1396. Bittker's position is truer today than when Bittker wrote in 1975. As of
2014, couples equity has been the bedrock of income taxation of marriage for over sixty-
five years.
18 For evidence that household allocations respond to sources of income, see, e.g., M.
Browning & P.A. Chiappori, Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Charac-
terization and Empirical Tests, 66 Econometrica 1242, passim (1998) (citing additional au-
thorities); Esther Duflo & Christopher Udry, Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Cote
d'Ivoire: Social Norms, Separate Accounts and Consumption Choices (Nat'l Bureau Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10498, 2004) (finding that household spending in Cote
d'Lvoire responds differentially to shocks to female versus male earnings).
19 See Bittker, note 15, at 1394-96.
20 See id. at 1400-03.
21 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), allowed couples to split income in community
property states but not in common law property states. This ruling led some states to
devise community property regimes to enable married couples to take advantage of in-
come splitting. For a discussion, see McCaffery, note 1, at 46-49.
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filing also obviates the need to allocate income from communal prop-
erty to one spouse or the other, an unavoidably byzantine process.
Both marriage neutrality and couples equity contain elements of
two more fundamental goals of an income tax-equity and efficiency.
A system of marriage taxation that is marriage neutral does not alter
incentives to marry, enhancing efficiency. Marriage neutrality also en-
sures that labor/leisure trade-offs are unaffected by the system of mar-
riage taxation. Marriage neutrality also embeds the equitable
principle that marriage should not change someone's tax liability.
Couples equity eliminates the incentive for specious transactions
between spouses, thereby enhancing efficiency. Couples equity also
stands in for the equitable assertion that income tax obligations
should be based on ability to pay, as measured by income. Ability to
pay depends upon the total income of the economic unit and the rele-
vant sharing rule for the economic unit. Any economic unit with per-
fect resource-sharing should be taxed as a single unit. Unfortunately,
the taxing authority is not privy to the sharing rules of various eco-
nomic units. Instead, the taxing authority must use some objective
indicator of economic sharing. Marriage is one such indicator.22 Fam-
ily law, for example, prescribes comprehensive sharing rules for prop-
erty owned by married couples, indicating that married couples have
agreed to become an economic unit to a greater degree than otherwise
similar unmarried couples. 23 Marriage also has an important social
resonance that indicates a degree of shared economic life and general
commitment. The ongoing struggle over same-sex marriage is a mod-
ern indicator of the salience attributed to "marriage," suggesting that
marriage is correlated with behavioral patterns such as economic shar-
ing. Because both marriage neutrality and couples equity contain ele-
ments of efficiency and equity, the conflict between marriage
neutrality and couples equity cannot be viewed as a simple efficiency/
equity trade-off.
22 See Bittker, note 15, at 1392-99.
23 See, e.g., Smith, note 4, at 234-40 (considering the suitability of various marital prop-
erty regimes' sharing rules as a basis for allocating taxable income). Henry Smith focuses
on this interaction between property law and tax to propose his creative "intermediate
filing" system for marriage taxation. See id. at 151-53. In some limited circumstances in-
termediate filing produces a marriage taxation regime that adheres to the approach devel-
oped here. See id. at 184 (describing intermediate filing, under which spouses' elective
income allocation could produce a tax result coinciding with that produced under the pre-
sent proposal). As currently proposed, however, intermediate filing often does not adhere
to the principles developed here. See, e.g., id. at 147-53 (describing the trilemma and then
presenting intermediate filing as a "third way" between achieving couples neutrality
through joint filing and marriage neutrality through individual filing). This deviation is
unsurprising, as Smith does not attempt to provide a general framework for taxation of
marriage, instead focusing on the property law/tax law tension, under joint filing, see id. at
211-18.
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This Article avoids adjudicating between couples equity and mar-
riage neutrality as goals for the taxation of marriage. On balance,
couples equity is a desirable property for an income tax. So is mar-
riage neutrality. Different scholars may feel differently about the rel-
ative desirability of each principle but should not deny that the other
side makes forceful arguments.
Instead of insisting on couples equity or marriage neutrality as ab-
solute principles, I hope to move past this "battle of the neutrali-
ties. '24 (Couples equity is sometimes termed couples neutrality.25 ) I
accept both couples equality and marriage neutrality as worthwhile
principles and seek to characterize good policy from this baseline.
In the next Part, I offer a general framework for evaluating any
formula for the taxation of marriage. The model of taxation of mar-
riage presented below begins from the simple premise that couples
equity, marriage neutrality, and progressivity are worthwhile, if in-
compatible, goals. While there are no magic bullets to resolve the
trilemma, the framework offers a more systematic way of studying the
taxation of marriage within the trilemma's constraints.
III. TRADING OFF PRINCIPLES IN THE TAXATION OF MARRIAGE
My model (described in this Part and presented in the Appendix)
assumes that both marriage neutrality and couples equity are valid
objectives for the taxation of marriage. (Progressivity is introduced
below.) The model allows for different weightings of the two objec-
tives. Proponents of individual filing are likely to put a greater weight
on marriage neutrality; joint filing advocates will emphasize couples
equity. The purpose of this modeling exercise is not to forestall these
debates, but rather to develop a common framework for them and to
dampen the debates' "all or nothing" quality. 26 Even if one finds the
arguments favoring marriage neutrality more persuasive than the ar-
guments favoring couples equity, this does not mean that couples eq-
uity is not a worthwhile goal.
A. Assumptions of the Framework
I assume that violations of couples equity and marriage neutrality
grow increasingly distasteful as deviations increase in scale. (In math-
24 See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Gender Biases
in the Code, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 983, 986 (1993).
25 See, e.g., Smith, note 4, at 147.
26 Compare, e.g., McIntyre & Oldman, note 2, at 1590, with, e.g., Pamela B. Gann,
Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tex. L. Rev.
1, 2 (1990).
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ematical terms, the costs of deviations are convex.) A pragmatic poli-
cymaker or social planner desiring marriage neutrality, other things
equal, is bothered relatively little by a difference in taxation of $100
caused by marriage. An additional $100 difference in taxation caused
by marriage troubles the policymaker more than the first $100, as the
violation of marriage neutrality grows more egregious. The poli-
cymaker takes a similar view towards violations of couples equity. 27
The assumption that costs of deviations from marriage neutrality
and couples equity are convex is reasonable but debatable. An abso-
lutist with lexical preferences with respect to marriage neutrality or
couples equity may assert that any deviation from principle is unac-
ceptable. Relatedly, there may be some fixed cost associated with de-
viating from one principle. If this is the case, then there are local
nonconvexities around absolute adherence to one principle or the
other. Alternatively, the costs of deviations from principle may be
constant. In this case, one chooses a preferred principle (couples eq-
uity or marriage neutrality) and follows it to its limit, and then worries
about satisfying the other principle.
But some of the goals embedded in both marriage neutrality and
couples equity almost certainly have convex costs of deviation. Part
of the appeal of marriage neutrality is that it removes tax incentives
that distort the decision to marry.28 Welfare economics demonstrates
the costs of such tax-oriented distortions are generally convex. 29 Simi-
larly, the desire for couples equity derives from a desire for tax equity
more generally. Nearly all utility functions that generate tax equity
imply that the costs of ever-increasing inequity are convex. For exam-
ple, diminishing marginal utility is one justification for tax equity and
progressive taxation,30 and many utility functions with diminishing
marginal utility have the degree of diminution of utility decreasing
with income, implying convex costs of deviations from equity. 31
27 It is important to note that the magnitude of violations of principle is easy to measure
in this context. The size of a violation of couples equity or marriage neutrality is measured
in dollars. When the size of violations of principle is hard to measure, the assumption of
convex costs to violations of principle becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to
implement.
28 For a discussion of marriage neutrality, bonuses, and penalties from a marriage incen-
tive perspective, see Zelenak, note 1, at 30-33.
29 See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 590-95 (3d ed. 2011).
30 See Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utili-
tarianism, 48 Nat'l Tax J. 497, 497 (1995). For a discussion of the basis for tax equity and a
critique of the independent normative function of horizontal equity, see id. at 499-502.
31 See Angus Deaton, Understanding Consumption 2-29 (1992) (demonstrating that
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions, the workhorse utility functions of
economics, exhibit diminishing absolute risk aversion). For an empirical demonstration of
CRRA's relevance, see Pierre-Andr6 Chiappori & Monica Paiella, Relative Risk Aversion
Is Constant: Evidence from Panel Data, 9 J. Eur. Econ. Ass'n 1021 passim (2011). Even
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Alternatively, choosing to follow either couples equity or marriage
neutrality exclusively pushes the costs of coping with the marriage tax-
ation trilemma entirely onto some parties, while leaving other parties
unaffected by the trilemma's bite. Behind a Rawlsian veil of igno-
rance, such a "solution" to the problem of marriage taxation is unap-
pealing.32 Rather than coping with the trilemma by disfavoring some
taxpayers but not others, taxpayers behind a veil of ignorance should
prefer to share the burdens of the trilemma more equally.
33
In addition, linear costs of deviation that would compel policymak-
ers to adopt one principle in its entirety are generally inapt for the
Code, which compromises among a host of competing principles. In-
deed, the history of the taxation of marriage demonstrates that neither
couples equity nor marriage neutrality is an inviolate principle-our
system of taxation, and that of many other countries, has deviated and
continues to deviate from both principles.34 Muddled compromise is
more consistent with convex costs of deviations from multiple princi-
ples than other assumptions about the costs of deviations from
principles.
For simplicity, I assume that the costs of deviations from couples
equity and marriage neutrality are quadratic, a simple convex func-
tional form that is also the form used in ordinary least squares regres-
sion and many other contexts. 3
5
the administrability argument that underlies couples equity-the fear of income shifting-
contains a convexity. If there is only a small violation of couples equity in the taxation of
marriage, then the only income-shifting transactions that occur will have low costs. As the
tax rates of individuals within a marriage diverge to a greater degree, the social and eco-
nomic costs of the income-shifting transactions that follow grow ever larger.
32 See Evan Tsen Lee, On the Received Wisdom in Federal Courts, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1111, 1135-36 (1999), for a concise explanation of the veil of ignorance and maximin deci-
sion strategy. When individuals are behind a veil of ignorance with regards to marital
status and tax regime, for example, the tax regimes of columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 are
unattractive. If a married couple has unequal incomes, then individual filing (the pre-1948
regime) is extremely problematic. CD pays much more than AB, in spite of having the
same income. If an unmarried couple has unequal income, then the 1948 to 1969 regime
(full income-splitting, Table 1, column 3a, tax of $2000 on both AB and CD) is extremely
problematic, as the couple pays an extreme singles penalty. If a married couple has equal
incomes in the post-1969 regime, then there is a severe marriage penalty. See Table 1,
column 3b. Behind a the veil of ignorance, a marital tax regime with convex costs of viola-
tions of principle improves the lot of the most disadvantaged citizen subject to the marital
tax system. As a result, the convex cost model is superior from the veil of ignorance per-
spective. See Lee, supra, at 1136.
33 This assertion could also be proven by assuming that taxpayers are risk-averse and
prefer to avoid tax regimes where they bear high taxes in some contexts and low taxes in
others. Risk-averse taxpayers prefer taxation of marriage regimes where the "accident" of
their marital status and income distribution affects their taxation as little as possible.
34 See McCaffery, note 24, at 989-91.
35 The assumption of quadratic deviation costs relative to ideal outcomes, commonly
known as loss functions, is common in economics as well as in statistical analysis. See, e.g.,
Kenneth Rogoff, Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,
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My framework allows for different opinions about the relative im-
portance of violations of marriage neutrality and couples equity. A
policymaker may prefer to weight one principle more heavily than the
other. In addition, the framework disaggregates marriage neutrality
into two sub-principles-marriage penalties (such as that encountered
by AB) and marriage bonuses (such as that encountered by CD).
36
A proponent of strict marriage neutrality would not distinguish be-
tween marriage penalties and marriage bonuses. Both penalties and
bonuses violate marriage neutrality. But it is also possible to feel
more strongly about one than the other. If marriage yields positive
social externalities, such as better child rearing, then a marriage bonus
may be desirable. 37 My framework also assumes that preferences re-
garding progressivity are defined by the individual filing schedule.
The progressivity of taxes on married couples filing jointly38 results
from the progressivity of the individual filing schedule and the desire
for couples equity and marriage neutrality.
39
B. The Structure of Marriage Penalties and Bonuses When Both
Couples Equity and Marriage Neutrality Can Be Violated
I now turn to the best structure for taxation of marriage when both
couples equity and marriage neutrality become violable principles.
As established above, we cannot achieve couples equity, marriage
neutrality, and have a progressive tax system. We can, however,
achieve two of the three principles of the trilemma.40 But the frame-
work developed in the Appendix and illustrated by Tables 1 through 3
implies that the best tax schedule for married couples satisfies neither
couples equity nor marriage neutrality. Why not achieve two of the
three principles when it is possible? Because doing so requires an ex-
treme violation of the third, which is socially undesirable. Convex
costs of deviations from principle imply that it is better to have small
violations of two principles than large violations of one.
100 Q.J. Econ. 1169, 1169-70, 1173-74 (1985) (describing a central banker or social planner
wishing to keep both inflation and unemployment at ideal rates and having convex (quad-
ratic) costs of deviation from these partially inconsistent goals).
36 Marriage penalties can also be described as "singles bonuses" and marriage bonuses
as "singles penalties."
37 If marriage yields positive externalities, then marriage neutrality should give way to
marriage subsidy. In the model, this corresponds to putting more weight on marriage pen-
alties than on marriage bonuses, which would lead to a subsidy. The trilemma remains,
though the optimal compromise changes.
38 IRC § 1(a).
39 This framework could be altered by introducing additional constraints regarding the
progressivity of the taxation of married couples filing jointly. For more details, see the
Appendix.
40 See notes 4-5 and accompanying text; Table 1, column (4).
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Column (5) from Table 1 provides an example of a marital tax
schedule favored by the framework. Income tax for married couples
depends upon both joint income and the distribution of the income
between the two members of the couple. Under this schedule AB
pays $2500 in tax and CD pays $3000. Neither couples equity nor
marriage neutrality is maintained through this tax schedule. CD pays
more than AB, violating couples equity. AB pays more in tax than
under individual filing, while CD pays less in tax than under individual
filing, violating marriage neutrality. But the size of the violations of
marriage neutrality and couples equity are considerably lower in the
column (5) schedule than in the marriage neutrality schedule of col-
umn (2) or the couples equity schedule of column (3). Column (2)
(marriage neutrality) violates couples equity by $1500. Column (3)
violates marriage neutrality for AB and CD by a total of $1500: Col-
umn (3a) gives a $1500 bonus to CD, while column (3b) gives a $1350
bonus to CD and a $150 penalty to AB. Column (5), by contrast, vio-
lates couples equity by $500, violates marriage neutrality by (a penalty
of) $500 for AB and violates marriage neutrality by (a bonus of) $500
for CD. The column (5) schedule thus violates couples equity by less
than the column (2) individual filing structure and violates marriage
neutrality by less than the column (3) joint filing structure. If large
violations of either couples equity or marriage neutrality are dispro-
portionately bad relative to small violations of either principle, then
the schedule proposed in column (5) is superior to existing treatments
of income taxation for married couples. Violating marriage neutrality
reduces the size of violations of couples equity, and violating couples
equity reduces the size of the violation of marriage neutrality.
C. Evaluating Policy Under the Framework
As suggested in the discussion of Table 1, pure individual filing or
joint filing schedules for married couples impose the burdens of the
trilemma entirely on some taxpayers rather than others. Individual
filing maintains marriage neutrality but egregiously violates couples
equity. Joint filing has the opposite problem, egregiously violating the
principle of marriage neutrality. I now use this framework to evaluate
several proposed reforms to these polar solutions to the taxation of
marriage.
1. Optional Individual Filing
In the late 1990's, the proposed (but unenacted) Marriage Tax Elim-
ination Acts sought to mitigate the marriage penalty by offering mar-
ried couples the choice between individual filing under § 1(c) and
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joint filing under § 1(a).41 This proposal had the benefit of simplicity.
It called for no new tax brackets or changes in property law. It also
would have unambiguously reduced the marriage penalty for couples
like AB. Couples would choose individual filing only if it reduced
their tax burden.
Column (3) of Table 2 presents a hypothetical tax schedule under
optional individual filing for married couples. If AB chooses individ-
ual filing and CD chooses joint filing, then neither couples equity nor
marriage neutrality is achieved. (AB would pay less tax than CD in
spite of equal combined incomes, and CD would pay less tax than C
and D would if they filed individually.) As a result, some argue that
optional filing is "strange," "incoherent" and "makes little sense."
'42
TABLE 2
OPTIONAL INDIVIDUAL FILING FOR MARRIED COUPLES
Taxpayer Tax if Single Married Individual Filing Choice of Individual Filing
(Income) (Marriage Neutrality) or Joint Filing
(1) (2) (3)
A $1000 $2000 $2000




C $0 $3500 $2150
($0) (No change in tax on Choose Joint Filing, Table




Table Description: For individual filing, columns (1) and (2), akin
to § 1(c) filing, reflect a 10% marginal rate on the first $10,000 of in-
come and a 25% marginal rate on income in excess of $10,000. Col-
umn (2) presents total taxes paid by each couple. Column (3) shows
the choice each couple would make between married individual filing
(Table 2, column (2)) and married joint filing (Table 1, column (3b)).
The framework developed here provides some theoretical coher-
ence to optional individual filing. Optional individual filing creates
the possibility of couples inequity but limits the size of marriage neu-
trality violations with respect to marriage penalties. If a couple pays
too much of a marriage penalty, then they will choose individual filing.
The end result, with some violation of marriage neutrality and couples
41 See Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax
Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
42 See, e.g., Zelenak, note 1, at 17-18.
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equity but fewer egregious violations of either, may be more desirable
than the status quo.
Optional § 1(c) filing is no panacea, however. It ensures that mar-
ried couples either benefit from joint filing or are unaffected by mar-
riage. Unmarried couples by contrast, enjoy no such option and
therefore are systematically disfavored. The availability of § 1(c) fil-
ing to married couples and the desire for couples equity also con-
strains the § l(a) joint filing obligation from being increased
substantially-to do so would create substantial couples inequity for
couples who do not opt in-thereby ensuring the continuation of large
marriage bonuses for couples with unequal income. In total, optional
§ 1(c) filing therefore "compromises" between marriage neutrality
and couples equity in an arbitrary fashion.
2. Child Care Tax Benefits and Couples Equity
Although the joint filing schedule of § l(a) provides for couples eq-
uity, other provisions of the Code undermine the marital tax sched-
ule's fidelity to couples equity. Suppose that AB and CD both have
one dependent child. Both AB and CD pay for child care. The terms
of the child care tax credit and dependent care flexible spending ac-
counts provide that AB can obtain preferential tax treatment for up to
$5000 in child care expenses.43 CD, by contrast, is not eligible for the
tax preferences because the preferences cannot be greater than the
income of either member of the couple, and C has no income. 44
Because AB can receive tax preferences that CD cannot because of
C's lack of income, the child care tax expenditures violate couples eq-
uity. Suppose married couples AB and CD with $20,000 in income
each owe $3000 in taxes. The child care tax expenditures reduce the
$3000 obligation for AB to $2500. This violation of couples equity is a
desirable one in my framework. A small degree of couples inequity is
introduced, but the large marriage bonus for CD is reduced, a worth-
while trade-off if large deviations from principles are more costly than
small ones.
Many European countries apply a similar "compromise" position to
the taxation of marriage broadly. Tax is determined individually, but
some forms of income for one spouse can benefit from splitting with
the other spouse and benefits are determined based on combined in-
come. The combined tax-and-transfer system of these countries there-
fore exhibits a hybrid of marriage neutrality and couples equity,
43 IRC §§ 21(c), 129(a)(2)(A).
44 IRC §§ 21(c), 129(b)(1). Note that, under some circumstances (for example, C is a
full-time student), C will be imputed income, and CD will receive a deduction. IRC
§§ 21(d)(2), 129(b)(2).
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adhering to neither but avoiding large deviations from either
principle.
45
3. Implementing the Ideal Policy: Reforming Married Filing
Separately
While optional individual filing and tax expenditures for child care
expenses both create couples inequity and reduce marriage non-neu-
trality, neither provides a comprehensive solution to the taxation of
marriage. Tax expenditures for child care reduce non-neutralities only
for those with children and are subject to many restrictions. Optional
individual filing reduces marriage penalties by introducing the possi-
bility of couples inequity but fails to address egregious violations of
marriage neutrality in the form of marriage bonuses or singles
penalties.
Taxation of marriage can achieve partial adherence to the principles
of couples equity and marriage neutrality through reform of the mar-
ried filing separately schedule of § 1(d) and a simultaneous change in
the brackets of § 1(a) (married filing jointly). 46 Currently, married
couples choose between the married filing jointly schedule of § 1(a)
and the married filing separately schedule of § 1(d). Section 1(d)'s
bracket and rate structure, however, make it an unattractive schedule
for nearly all married couples.47 Few couples choose to file sepa-
rately.48 But § 1(d)'s schedule could be reformed to reduce the mar-
riage penalty for couples with equal incomes (such as AB), while
leaving couples with unequal incomes unaffected. A reformed § 1(d)
would mitigate violations of marriage neutrality, allowing a reformed
§ 1(a) joint filing schedule to offer less of a bonus to couples with
unequal incomes. Section 1(d) would act as a relief valve, preventing
a less favorable § 1(a) schedule from imposing an egregious marriage
penalty on couples with equal income.
Reforming § 1(d) separate filing is distinct from granting couples
the option to file individually under § 1(c). As discussed above, op-
tional § 1(c) filing was too favorable towards marriage. Reformed
45 See Jonathan R. Kesselman, Income Splitting and Joint Taxation of Couples: What's
Fair?, 14 IRPP Choices 1, 14-17 (2008), http://archive.irpp.org/choices/archive/
voll4nol.pdf.
46 Other reforms, such as earnings credits for second earners, could achieve the same
thing. See McCaffery, note 24, at 1001.
47 Cases in which married couples may choose to file separately include estrangement,
fear of liability associated with filing a joint return, and the ability to take advantage of a
deduction for unreimbursed medical expenses that must exceed 10% of adjusted gross in-
come. See IRC § 213. In Table 3 I assume that none of these considerations apply to AB
or CD.
48 See IRS, Statistics of Income 2011: Individual Income Tax Returns 82 tbl.1.6 (2013).
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§ 1(d) filing, by contrast, would retain a (reduced) marriage penalty
for couples with equal incomes. As a result, income tax obligations
under § 1(a) could be increased without creating dramatic couples in-
equities, thereby mitigating the marriage bonus or singles penalty of
the taxation of marriage to a greater degree than optional § 1(c) filing.
Table 3 illustrates the flaws of the current § 1(d) in column (4) and
the merits of a reformed § 1(d) and reformed § 1(a) in columns (5)
and (3b).
TABLE 3
REFORM PROPOSAL FOR MARRIED FILING SEPARATELY
Taxpayer Tax if Married Married Joint Married Joint Current § 1(d) Reformed
(Income) Single Individual Filing Filing Couples Filing Couples Schedule 10% § 1(d) Schedule
Marriage Equity) Equity) Marginal Rate 10% Marginal
Neutrality) Current Reform on First $5000, Rate on First




(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4) (5)
A $1000 $2000 $2150 $3050 $1750 $1300
($10,000) (No change in (Same as CD) (Same as CD)
tax on
marriage)
B $1000 $1750 $1300
($10,000) Combined Combined
Tax = $3500 Tax = $2600
(AB chooses (Lower than col.
l(a) filing from (3b) tax of
col. (3a)) $3050)
C $0 $3500 $2150 $3050 $0 $0
($0) (No change in Same as AB) (Same as AB)
tax on
marriage)
D $3500 $4250 $3800
($20,000) = (CD chooses (CD chooses
$1000 § l(a) filing § l(a) filing
+ from col. (3a)) from col. (3b))
$2500
Table Description: For individual filing, columns 3(b) and (2), akin
to § 1(c) filing, apply a 10% marginal rate on the first $10,000 of in-
come and a 25% marginal rate on income in excess of $10,000. For
married joint filing, akin to § 1(a) from 1969 to the present, column
(3a) applies a 10% marginal rate on the first $19,000 of income and a
25 % marginal rate on income in excess of $19,000. For reformed joint
filing under § 1(a), column (3b) reflects a 10% marginal rate on the
first $13,000 of income and a 25% marginal rate on income in excess
of $13,000. For married filing separately (§ 1(d)) under the current
regime, column (4), there is a 10% marginal rate on the first $5000 of
income and a 25% marginal rate on income in excess of $5000. For
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married filing separately (§ l(d)) under this Article's reform proposal
(column (5)), there is a 10% marginal rate on the first $8000 of in-
come and a 25% marginal rate on income in excess of $8000.
Column 4 depicts the current married filing separately schedule.
Note that under that schedule, both AB and CD pay more than they
would by filing jointly as in column (3a). Thus, no one chooses to file
under this schedule. The reformed § l(d) schedule of column (5)
(10% tax rate on the first $8000 of income, with a 25% rate thereaf-
ter), becomes attractive for AB, as the combined $2600 in tax they
owe filing under § 1(d) is less than the $3050 they owe under the re-
formed § l(a) joint filing schedule illustrated in column (3b). CD,
however, chooses to pay $3050 under the reformed § 1(a) of column
(3b) rather than the amount owed under § 1(d) of $3800. A reformed
§ 1(d) and § l(a) therefore mitigate violations of both marriage neu-
trality and couples equity. (Note that the numbers could be changed
as needed.) AB pays a marriage penalty of $600. CD enjoys a mar-
riage bonus of $450. AB pays $450 less in taxes than CD. There are
thus violations of couples equity, marriage bonuses, and marriage pen-
alties, but the size of all of these violations is smaller than the worst
violations under any of the other reform proposals.49 With couples
equity and progressivity, by contrast, CD enjoys a marriage bonus of
$1500.
By doing nothing more radical than adjusting the brackets of the
two already-existing filing options for married couples, reforming
§ 1(d) and § 1(a)'s schedules achieves a sensible compromise between
marriage neutrality and couples equity.50 Compromise in the taxation
of marriage of the sort advocated here is therefore comparatively sim-
ple to achieve.
D. Secondary Earner Incentives
One problem with violations of marriage neutrality that has re-
ceived little attention in this article is the impact of joint filing on sec-
ond earners' incentives to work. Joint filing implies that the marginal
tax rate is the same for both spouses in a married couple. Effectively,
the primary earner's marginal rate goes down while the secondary
49 If AB were given the option of filing under § 1(b), then AB would pay $2000. If
nothing else were changed in Table 3, then there would be a marriage bonus of $450 for
CD and a $1050 violation of couples equity between AB and CD.
50 When married couples file separately in community property states, they obtain the
opportunity to split income under Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Because the mar-
ried filing separately rate is generally less advantageous to the lower-earning spouse than
the individual filing rate, such income-splitting opportunities loom smaller with married
filing separately than they do under individual filing, though income splitting remains an
issue. See McCaffery, note 24, at 989 n.17.
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earner's marginal rate rises. Many commentators have argued that
this is inefficient-the labor supply of secondary earners is highly elas-
tic.51 It also reinforces stereotypical gender roles. Secondary earners
are disproportionately women and reducing their incentive to work
encourages them to stay at home.
52
Not surprisingly, the policy proposals examined here ameliorate but
do not eliminate this negative side effect of joint filing. They amelio-
rate the secondary earner incentive effect because they move marital
taxation closer to marriage neutrality than traditional joint taxation.
They do not eliminate the secondary earner bias because they fail to
achieve perfect marriage neutrality.
Consider the reformed § 1(a) and § 1(d) proposal put forth in the
previous Subsection. This proposal either would eliminate the secon-
dary earner problem entirely or would not affect it at all. CD would
be unlikely to file under § 1(d) because the splitting benefit of joint
filing would be so large. As a result, C's marginal tax rate for the first
hour of work would be 25%, the highest marginal rate. But other
secondary earners might benefit. Consider a couple EF where E
makes $13,000 and F makes $7000. EF save money by choosing re-
formed § 1(d) separate filing, which would impose income taxes of
$2050 on E and $700 on F for a total of $2750, over reformed § l(a),
which would impose a tax of $3050 (column 3b). With the reform to
§ 1(a) and § 1(d) proposed above, Fs marginal rate would become
10%, meaning that F is taxed at the lowest marginal rate.
A similar story can be told for many of the other reform initiatives
presented here, including the ones original to this Article. They gen-
erally improve but do not eliminate the increase in marginal rates of
secondary earners generated by marriage.
IV. PROGRESSIVE MARGINAL RATES AND THE TAXATION OF MARRIAGE
Previous discussions of the taxation of marriage avoid consideration
of progressive income tax rates. Although progressivity is required to
create the battle of the neutralities, progressivity is assumed to be a
separate principle, derived from priorities unlike the foundations of
marriage neutrality or couples equity.53 My framework does not delve
into the foundations of progressivity. Nevertheless, progressivity is in-
51 See, e.g., Gruber & Saez, note 12, at 4; Chris William Sanchirico, Progressivity and
Potential Income: Measuring the Effect of Changing Work Patterns on Income Tax
Progressivity, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1551, 1582 (2008).
52 See McCaffery, note 1, at 120-26.
53 E.g. Smith, note 4, at 152 n.15 (assuming progressive rates and arguing that "the real
challenge of the trilemma is to accommodate this basic assumption of progressive rates
with the least objectionable of the remaining alternatives").
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cluded as a choice variable in the model. Unless the current degree of
progressivity is a sacred principle that cannot be compromised, we
may want to sacrifice some degree of progressivity in order to reduce
the size of violations to the principles of marriage neutrality and
couples equity.
The argument is by now a familiar one. Suppose that the progres-
sivity of individual tax schedules is sacrosanct. This creates considera-
ble pressure on marriage neutrality and couples equity. Indeed, the
focus of this Article to this point has been how to best handle this
tension. But imagine a small movement towards a more linear tax
system. That is, a rate schedule that is progressive but slightly less
than currently so. This should not "cost" too much in terms of
progressivity. The revised degree of progressivity is only slightly less
progressive than the ideal schedule. This small change, however,
reduces relatively large deviations from the principles of marriage
neutrality and couples equity. If large deviations from principle are
disproportionately more problematic than small deviations, then the
degree of progressivity should be reduced to reduce the tension be-
tween marriage neutrality and couples equity. The degree to which
progressivity should be sacrificed depends upon the relative weight
assigned to violations of progressivity versus violations of marriage
neutrality and couples equity. But even if violations of progressivity
are considered much more important than violations of the other two
principles, the framework developed here still calls for some reduction
in progressivity relative to the ideal amount. Table 4 illustrates this
policy prescription.
TABLE 4
REFORM PROPOSAL WITH ADJUSTED PROGRESSIVITY
Taxpayer Tax if Married Married Joint Filing Married Joint Filing Reformed § l(d)
(Income) Single Individual Filing (Couples Equity) (Couples Equity) Schedule of 12%
(Marriage Neutrality) Current Schedule, Reform Proposal Marginal Rate on
Less Progressivity First $8000, 23%
on Excess
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4)
A $1200 $2400 $2510 $3170 $1420
($10,000) (No change in tax on (Same as CD) (Same as CD)
marriage)
B $1200 $1420
($10,000) Combined Tax -
$2840
(Lower than col. (3b)
tax of $3170)
C $0 $3500 $2510 $3170 $0
($0) (No change in tax on (Same as AB) (Same as AB)
marriage)
D $3500 = $3720
($20,000) $1200 + (CD chooses § l(a)
$2300 filing from col. (3b))
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Table Description: For individual filing, columns (1) and (2) apply a
12% marginal rate on the first $10,000 of income and a 23% marginal
rate on income in excess of $10,000. For married joint filing, akin to a
less progressive § l(a) from 1969 to the present, column (3a) applies a
12% marginal rate on the first $19,000 of income and a 23% marginal
rate on income in excess of $19,000. For married joint filing, column
(3b) applies this Article's reformed §1(a) of a 12% marginal rate on
the first $13,000 of income and a 23% marginal rate on income in
excess of $13,000. For married filing separately (§ 1(d)) under this
Article's reform proposal (column (4)), there would be a 12% margi-
nal rate on the first $8000 of income, and a 23% marginal rate on
income in excess of $8000.
Table 4 modifies the individual marginal rate structure applied in
Tables 1 through 3. In Table 4, the first bracket is taxed at a 12% rate
rather than the 10% of Tables 1 through 3. The marginal rate on in-
come in the second bracket is 23% in Table 4, rather than 25% as in
Tables 1 through 3. These modifications make Table 4's rate structure
less progressive than the previous structure. But only slightly. No
one's taxes change dramatically. The poor pay a bit more, the rich
slightly less.
The less progressive rate structure of all columns in Table 4 reduces
the scope of the couples equity or marriage neutrality trade-off em-
phasized in the previous Parts. If marriage neutrality was maintained,
as in Table 4 (columns (1) and (2)), couples equity would be violated
by $1100, rather than the $1500 violation that characterized individual
filing in Tables 1 through 3. If couples equity was maintained, as in
Table 4, column (3a), the size of marriage bonuses and penalties
would be reduced. Whatever tax obligation is chosen for joint filers
with incomes of $20,000 (in column (3a) the obligation is $2510), the
total value of marriage penalties and bonuses would be $1100, rather
than $1500 as in previous tables. Finally, if neither marriage neutrality
nor couples equity was maintained (column (4)), as in the reform of
the § l(a) (column (3b)) and § l(d) (column (4)) married filing sepa-
rately schedules, then marriage taxation would be characterized by
relatively small violations of the principles of progressivity, marriage
neutrality (AB would pay a marriage penalty of $440, CD would re-
ceive a marriage bonus of $330), and couples equity (CD would pay
$330 more in taxes than AB).
The problems of marriage taxation do not imply that progressivity
should be disregarded. But progressivity is not a Boolean variable.
Tax rates can be more or less progressive. Society may wish to reduce
the degree of progressivity to reduce violations of couples equity and/
or marriage neutrality. The weight given to violations of ideal
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progressivity relative to couples equity or marriage neutrality deter-
mines the size of the change to the progressive rate structure. Higher
weights on progressivity imply smaller changes to the progressive rate
structure
V. CONCLUSION
I began with the trilemma of marriage taxation. Marriage taxation
can comply with only two principles from among the three-progres-
sivity, marriage neutrality, and couples equity. But the framework de-
veloped here reframes the question. Just as drawing a line of "best
fit" to a plot of data is not an insoluble problem simply because all the
data points do not align, so too marriage taxation is not an insoluble
problem to be left to debaters arguing the merits of which of the three
principles to discard. In drawing a best fit line, the goal is to minimize
deviations between the line and given points, with disproportionately
greater weight given to large deviations, which render the line much
less valuable as a predictive tool. Similarly, the marriage taxation
trilemma should be solved by achieving a tax schedule of "best fit"
between the principles of progressivity, marriage neutrality, and
couples equity. Large deviations from any of these three principles
should be avoided, as a large deviation from a valuable principle is
disproportionately more offensive than a smaller deviation. As a re-
sult, none of the principles receives absolute fealty, just as no point in
a plot of data is guaranteed to be on the "best fit" line.
The arguments about the relative merits of progressivity, couples
equity, and marriage neutrality remain. But they are arguments of
degree-how much weight should one principle receive relative to the
other-rather than of kind.
The framework developed here may have broader application in tax
scholarship. International tax scholars debate the merits of capital im-
port neutrality versus capital export neutrality. 54 Both "neutralities"
have their advocates, but an international tax system cannot achieve
both.55 The framework developed here suggests that perhaps the tax
system should not try. If both "neutralities" are desirable, then a sys-
tem that achieves partial but imperfect fealty to both is probably bet-
ter than a system that achieves one or the other absolutely.
54 For a discussion, see Charles E. McLure, Jr., Must Corporate Income Be Taxed
Twice? 204-16 (1979).
55 See Daniel N. Shaviro, Fixing U.S. International Taxation 121-41 (2014).




Assume that there are four taxpayers, A, B, C, and D. AB is one
couple and CD is another couple. Assume that AB's income equals
CD's income and that CD's income is more unequal than AB's in-
come. Let T(A), T(B), T(C), and T(D) be the income tax owed by
each individual under § 1(c). This framework can be generalized with
little additional insight but considerable additional notation as ex-
plained below. Let T(AB) and T(CD) be the tax each couple owes if
they are married. Assume the following social welfare (or loss) func-
tion for taxation of marital incomes:
a[T(AB) - (T(A) + T(B))]2 + p]T(CD) - (T(C) + T(D))]2 = y[T(AB) -
T(CD)]2  (1)
Where a is the relative social importance placed on marriage penal-
ties, 13 is the relative social importance placed on marriage bonuses/
singles penalties, and y is the relative social importance placed on vio-
lations of couples equity. The loss function is quadratic. Social wel-
fare goes down with the square of the deviation from marriage
neutrality (bonus/penalty) and couples equity. The quadratic loss
function implies that large violations of marriage neutrality, couples
equity, or both are considerably worse than smaller violations.
A social planner seeks a marital taxation regime that maximizes so-
cial welfare given relevant constraints. Suppose that the social plan-
ner's commitment to progressivity exogenously dictates the value of
T(A), T(B), T(C), and T(D), with T(C) + T(D) > T(A) + T(B), [As-
sumption P].
Solution for Section III. C
Assume that the individual progressive rate structure is inviolable,
such that T(A), T(B), T(C), and T(D) are fixed exogenously. For sim-
plicity, assume that T(C) equals zero. Adherence to couples equity
and marriage neutrality is desirable. The social planner's problem
given the loss function of Equation (1) now becomes:
maxT(AB), T(CD) a[T(AB) - (T(A) + T(B))]2 + [3[T(CD) - (T(C) + T(D))]
2
+ y[T(AB)- T(CD) 2,
yielding the following first order conditions:aU
aT(AB) = 2a[T(AB) - (T(A) + T(B))] + 2y[T(AB) - T(CD)] = 0 (2)
T(CD) = 2fl[T(CD) - (T(C) + T(D))] - 2y[T(AB) - T(CD)] = 0 (3)
These first order conditions imply the following proposition:
Proposition 1: If the social welfare function values avoiding mar-
riage penalties, marriage bonuses, and couples inequity (a > 0, 3 > 0, y
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> 0), then optimal taxation of marriage achieves neither marriage neu-
trality nor couples equity.
Proof
T(C) = 0
Solving for T(AB) and T(CD) in Equations (2) and (3) yields
flyT(D) + (cay + afl)T(A) + (ay + afl)T(B)
TAB = (8 + a)y + afl
T(CD) = (fly + afl)T(D) + cyT(A) + ayT(B)
(fl + a)y + aft
From Assumption P, T(D) = T(A) + T(B)+E, epsilon is positive so
T(AB) = fiye + (ay + af + fly)T(A) + (cay + af) + fly)T(B) (4)(ft + a)y + af)
T(CD) = (fly + af)e + (ay + afl + fy)T(A) + (ay + afl + fy)T(B) (5)(fl + a)y + afl
Since ( 3Py + a3) > [3y and the rest of the numerator and denominator
of Equations (4) and (5) are identical, T(CD) > T(AB), which violates
couples equity.
For violation of marriage neutrality, Equation 4 simplifies to
T(AB) = + T(A) + T(B), so
(fl + a)y + af
T(AB) # T(A) + T(B). Plugging in T(D)-E = T(A) + T(B) into the
solution for T(CD) yields
(fly + crfl)T(D) + ary(T(D) - e) ayE
T(CD) = = T()
(fl + a)y + fl T fly + aty + a
so T(CD) # T(D), violating marriage neutrality.
The proof also demonstrates that T(AB) > T(A) + T(B) and T(CD)
< T(D)-couples equity-is achieved only if a = 0, which is ruled out
by assumption, or if T(AB) = T(A) + T(B). Equation (3) implies that
T(AB) = T(CD)-couples equity-is achieved only if 3 = 0, which is
ruled out by assumption, or if T(CD) = T(CD) + T(D). Thus couples
equity can be achieved only if T(A) + T(B) = T(CD) + T(D). But this
cannot be true because of Assumption P above. So couples equity
cannot be achieved in this maximization context. If couples equity is
not possible, T(AB) T(CD), then Equation (2) and a > 0, y > 0 imply
that T(AB) # T(A) + T(B), and Equation (3) and 3 > 0, y > 0 imply
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that T(CD) # T(C) + T(D). Marriage neutrality is thus violated.
There are both marriage penalties and marriage bonuses.5 6
Solution for Section IV
Relax Assumption P that the § 1(c) progressive individual filing tax
schedule is not subject to change. Instead, assume that there is a so-
cially desired degree of progressivity. For simplicity, assume that ideal
progressivity is given by where K > 1. Now the social welfare function
of Equation (1) is modified as follows:
a[T(AB) - (T(A) + T(B))]2 + p[T(CD) - (T(C) + T(D))]2 + y[T(AB) -
T(CD)]2 + 8[T(D) - K(T(A)) + T(B))] 2  (6)
Equation (6) simplifies to Equation (1) if 8, the social weight placed
on violations of the desired progressive individual tax schedule, ap-
proaches infinity, meaning that society is not willing to compromise on
its desired progressive tax schedule. With Equation (6), the social
planner's problem becomes
max a[T(AB) - (T(A) + T(B))1 2
T(AB), T(CD), T(A), T(B), T(D)
+ fl[T(CD) - (T(C) + T(D))] 2 + y[T(AB) - T(CD)]
2
+ &[T(D) - c(T(A) + T(B))]
2
Yielding first order conditions with respect to T(AB) and T(CD)
that are the same as Equations (2) and (3), as well as
aU
OT(A) = -2a[T(AB) - (T(A) + T(B))] - 26c[T(D) - K(T(A) + T(B))] = 0
aU
OT(B) = 2a[T(AB) - (T(A) + T(B))] - 26K[T(D) - c(T(A) + T(B))] = 
0
aT(D =  2f[T(CD) - (T(C) + T(D))] - 26[T(D) - (T(A) + T(B))] = 0
au
- = 2/3[T(AB) - (T(A) + T(B))] - 2y[T(AB) - T(CD)] = 0
aT(AB)
au - = 2fl[T(CD) - (T(C) + T(D))] - 2y[T(AB) - T(CD)] = 0
aT(CD)
Proposition 2: If the social welfare function values progressivity,
marriage neutrality (with respect to both penalties and bonuses), and
couples inequity (a > 0, 30, y > 0, 8 > 0), then the optimal taxation of
marriage does not maintain the ideal degree of progressivity, fails
marriage neutrality, and fails couples equity.
56 Solving the first order conditions for T(AB) and T(CD) produces little of note.
Higher social weights placed on marriage penalties, bonuses, and couples equity produce
smaller marriage penalties, bonuses, and couples inequity, respectively.




Rather than solving this involved system of equations, I note that
each equation consists of two principles. The first and second equa-
tions involve marriage neutrality for AB and ideal progressivity. The
third equation involves marriage neutrality for CD and ideal progres-
sivity. The fourth equation involves marriage neutrality for AB and
couples equity, and the fifth equation involves marriage neutrality for
CD and couples equity. Thus, if one of the principles is violated, then
all the principles must be violated. If one of the principles is violated,
then a part of one of the equations is nonzero. To make the first order
condition true, the other part of the equation must be violated, mean-
ing that another of the principles must be violated. By the same argu-
ment, the violation of a second principle implies the violation of a
third principle and the fourth. So if any one principle is violated, then
they are all violated. We know from the "trilemma" that all of the
principles cannot be maintained. So at least one principle must be
violated, meaning that they are all violated.
Generalizing the Proofs
For simplicity, the proofs involved a four-person, two-couple econ-
omy. But the proofs can be generalized as follows. Assume that there
are N couples and 2N people. The jth couple has income of I=I + ,
where I denotes the income of the first member of the couple. Taxes
for the jth couple are given by T(,) and the taxes of the first member
of the couple if filing individually are T(Pj and given exogenously by
the desire for progressivity. A generalized social loss function with
respect to the taxation of marriage would be
N { a [T (I,) - T (111) - T (IJ2)] 2 + YEN WEIGHT (1j, -Ij) [T(1 1) - T(JjI )12}
where (Ij - I is a weighting function indicating the weight to be placed
on two couples with similar incomes for evaluating violations of
couples equity. (If the couples do not have similar incomes, the devia-
tion in taxes between them may not be problematic from the perspec-
tive of a desire for couples equity.)
Choosing T(j) for all j to minimize this loss function yields similar,
albeit more complicated, first-order conditions to the two-couple ex-
ample examined above. The optimal taxation of marriage will be a
"compromise" that reflects the conflicting desires to have marriage
neutrality and couples equity. Both principles will be violated to some
degree, assuming a desire for progressive income taxes.
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